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Abstract
A new applicable wiretap channel with separated side information is considered here which consist of a sender,
a legitimate receiver and a wiretapper. In the considered scenario, the links from the transmitter to the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper experience different conditions or channel states. So, the legitimate receiver and the
wiretapper listen to the transmitted signal through the channels with different channel states which may have some
correlation to each other. It is assumed that the transmitter knows the state of the main channel non-causally and
uses this knowledge to encode its message. The state of the wiretap channel is not known anywhere. An achievable
equivocation rate region is derived for this model and is compared to the existing works. In some special cases, the
results are extended to the Gaussian wiretap channel.
Index Terms
Equivocation rate, secrecy capacity, side information, wiretap channel, perfect secrecy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure communication from an information theoretic perspective was first studied by Shannon in his famous
paper [1], where a noiseless channel model was assumed with an eavesdropper which has an identical copy of the
encrypted message as a legitimate receiver, and the sufficient and necessary condition for perfect secrecy using
information theoretic concepts were established. In the Shannon’s model, a source message W is encrypted to a
ciphertext E by a key K shared by the transmitter and the receiver. An eavesdropper, which knows the family
of encryption functions, i.e., keys and the probability of choosing the keys, may intercept the ciphertext E. The
system is considered to be perfectly secure if the a posteriori probabilities of W for all E would be equal to the a
priori probabilities, i.e., P (W |E) = P (W ). Alternatively, Shannon proved that the perfect secrecy can be achieved
only when the secret key is at least as long as the plaintext message or more precisely, when H(K) ≥ H(W ).
The wiretap channel was first introduced and studied by Wyner in his fundamental paper [2] which is the most
basic physical layer model explains the communication security’s problems. In his model, the transmitter wishes
to transmit a source signal, i.e., a confidential message, to a legitimate receiver in a way that this message be kept
secret from an eavesdropper. In this model illustrated in Fig. 1, despite of the Shannon’s model, it is assumed that the
channel to the eavesdropper is a physically degraded version of the channel to the legitimate receiver. In other words,
the channel’s output at the eavesdropper may be a noisy version of the channel output at the legitimate receiver. On
the other hand, the transmitter communicates to the intended receiver through the main channel which may be noisy
or noiseless, but the wiretapper receives a noisy copy of the message through a wiretap channel which is a cascade
of the main channel. In addition, Wyner [2] assumed that the eavesdropper knows the transmitter’s encoding-
decoding scheme. So, the objective is maximizing the rate of reliable communication such that the wiretapper
realizes as little as possible about the source output. The information leakage was measured by equivocation rate
as ∆ , H(SK |ZN ), where SK and ZN are represented the message set and the channel output at the wiretapper,
respectively. Eavesdropper is assumed to be a passive receiver which does not transmit any signal over the channel.
Furthermore, Wyner [2] proposed a basic principle coding strategy to achieve secure communication for wiretap
channels which is based on the fact that the eavesdropper is not able to decode any information more than it’s
channel capacity.
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner generalized the Wyner’s wiretap channel [3]. In their model, it is assumed that the wiretap
channel’s output is not necessarily a degraded version of the legitimate receiver’s one. They showed that the secrecy
capacity can be expressed as Cs = maxU→X→(Y,Z)[I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)], where X , Y and Z are the channel input,
the channel output in the legitimate receiver and the channel output at the wiretapper, respectively. Moreover, the
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Fig. 1. Wyner’s Wiretap channel [2]. In this channel, it is assumed that the channel to the eavesdropper is physically degraded version of the
channel to the legitimate receiver.
maximization is over all random variables U in joint distribution with X , Y and Z such that U → X → (Y, Z)
forms a Markov Chain.
Using the channel state information in communication channel models was introduced by Shannon in his landmark
paper [4], where he assumed the availability of Channel Side Information at the Transmitter (CSIT). Gel’fand and
Pinsker in their essential work [5] proved that the capacity of the state-dependent discrete memoryless channel with
non-causally CSIT is given by C = maxp(u,x|v)[I(U ;Y ) − I(U ;V )], where the maximum is taken over all input
distribution p(u, x|v) with a finite alphabet auxiliary random variable U .
Costa in his well known paper named Writing on Dirty Paper, extended this result to the Gaussian channel and
showed that for this channel, interference did not affect the capacity [6]. He chose U = X + αV and maximized
the Gel’fand and Pinsker’s capacity over all quantity of α and proved that for this value of α, the capacity of the
channel reduces to the channel without states. The dirty paper channel was extended to the basic Gaussian wiretap
channel with side information by Mitrpant and et al. [7], in which an achievable and upper bound for this channel
has been introduced.
Chen and Vinck investigated Wyner’s wiretap channel with side information [8] (Fig. 2). Their results are based on
the previous wiretap channel’s results in [2], [3], [7] and the discrete memoryless channel with state information [5].
They gave an achievable rate region which is established using a combination of the Gel’fand-Pinsker coding and
the Wyner’s wiretap coding. They extended their results to the Gaussian wiretap channel with side information
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Fig. 2. Wiretap channel with side information introduced by Chen and Vinck [8].
Fig. 3. Wiretap channel with two–sided channel state information [9].
using the same technique like dirty paper channel [8].
Furthermore, there were some different works on the wiretap channel with and without side information. The
work [10] studied the two way wiretap channel. The Gaussian wiretap channel with m-pam inputs was considered
in [11] and the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel was investigated by [12].
Liu et al. in [9], studied the two-sided channel state problem in the discrete memoryless wiretap channel, where
as shown in Fig. 3, the information of the two-sided channel states are available at the transmitter and the main
receiver, respectively. In addition, in their scenario the wiretap channel is not necessarily a degraded version of the
main channel. An achievable rate equivocation region for this general case is given in [9]. Khisti et. al., considered
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the secret-key agreement problem in the wiretap channel [13], [14]. In their model, the transmitter communicates
to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper over a discrete memoryless wiretap channel with a memoryless
state sequence. The transmitter and the legitimate receiver generate a shared secret key that remains secret from
the eavesdropper. The results are comparable to the wiretap channel introduced by [8]. Recently, an improved
lower bound for the wiretap channel with causal state information at the transmitter and receiver has been reported
in [15], where the achievability of the rate region is proved using block Markov coding, Shannon strategy, and key
generation from the common state information [4]. The state sequence available at the end of each block, is used to
generate a key which is used to enhance the transmission rate of the confidential message in the following block.
In this paper, we introduce a new wiretap channel model with side information, in which the wiretapper’s messages
is not a degraded version of the legitimate receiver’s one. On the other hand, the transmitter sends its message
through the main and the wiretap channels. So, the receiver and the wiretapper listen to the sent message from
the separated channels with different characteristics, i.e., different channel states. This model is a general case
of Chen–Vinck [8] and Wyner wiretap channel [2] and reduces to these channels in special cases. We extend our
model to the Gaussian wiretap channel where the states of the main and wiretapper channels are different with some
correlation coefficients. In the Gaussian case, if the correlation coefficients are equal to one, our channel reduces to
Chen–Vinck’s channel. The proposed channel is illustrated in Fig. 4. The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
In Section II, the channel model is introduced. The main results are presented in Section III. In Section IV, the
proof of the main results are given. In Section V, the results are extended to the Gaussian case and the paper is
concluded in the last section.
II. CHANNEL MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
First, we clear our notation in this paper. Let X be a finite set. Denote its cardinality by |X |. If we consider XN ,
the members of XN will be written as xN = (x1, x2, ..., xN ), where subscripted letters denote the components
and superscripted letters denote the vector. A similar convention applies to random vectors and random variables,
which are denoted by uppercase letters.
Consider the situation shown in Fig. 4. Assume that the state information of the main channel, i.e., the channel from
the transmitter to the legitimate receiver, is known at the encoder non-causally but the state of the wiretapper’s
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Fig. 4. The new more general wiretap channel with side information. The wiretapper’s messages is not a degraded version of the legitimate
receiver’s one and the receiver and the wiretapper listen to the sent message from the separated channels with different channel states.
channel is unknown and the channels’ states, i.e. Vti, t = 1, 2, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d), but V1i and V2i are correlated. The transmitter sends the message sk ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M} to the
legitimate receiver in N channel uses. Based on the sk and vN , the encoder generates the codeword xN and
transmits it on the main and the wiretap channels. The decoder at the legitimate receiver makes an estimation of
the transmitted message sˆk based on the received message yN . The corresponding output at the wiretapper is zN .
The channels are memoryless, i.e.,
p(yN |xN , vN ) =
N∏
i=1
p(yi|xi, vi) (1)
p(zN |xN , vN ) =
N∏
i=1
p(zi|xi, vi) (2)
Assume that Sk is uniformly distributed on {1, 2, . . . ,M}, so H(Sk) = logM . The average probability of error Pe
is given by
Pe =
1
M
M∑
i=1
Pr(Sˆk(Y N ) 6= i|Sk = i) (3)
We define the rate of the transmission to the intended receiver to be
R =
logM
N
(4)
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and the fractional equivocation wiretapper to be
d =
H(Sk|ZN)
H(Sk)
(5)
Obviously, we have H(Sk|ZN ) = NRd.
III. MAIN RESULTS:
OUTER AND INNER BOUNDS
Like [8], we say that the pair (R∗, d∗) is achievable, if for all ǫ > 0, there exists an encoder-decoder pair such
that
R ≥ R∗ − ǫ, d ≥ d∗ − ǫ, Pe ≤ ǫ. (6)
Definition 1: The secrecy capacity Cs is the maximum R∗ such that (R∗, 1) is achievable.
Definition 2: We denote
RU1 = I(U ;Y )−max{I(U ;V1, V2), I(U ;Z)} (7)
RU2 = I(U ;Y )− I(U ;V1, V2) (8)
dU2 =
RU1
RU2
= I(U ;Y )−max{I(U ;V1,V2),I(U ;Z)}
I(U ;Y )−I(U ;V1,V2) (9)
where U is an auxiliary random variable such that U → (X,V1, V2)→ (Y, Z) forms a Markov chain. Now, consider
the following result:
Theorem 1: For the discrete memoryless channel with side information shown in Fig. 4, we denote RU as the
set of points (R, d) with RU1 ≤ R ≤ RU2, 0 ≤ d ≤ 1 and Rd = RU1. Let
R′U , {(R
′
, d
′
) : 0 ≤ R′ ≤ R, 0 ≤ d′ ≤ d, (R, d) ∈ RU}. (10)
Then the set R, defined as following, is achievable:
R =
⋃
U→(X,V1,V2)→(Y,Z)
R′U . (11)
The region is achievable if we limit the cardinality of U by the constraint |U| ≤ |X ||V1||V2|+ 4.
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Proof: The proof of the theorem is relegated to the next Section. The constraint is implied by lemma 3 of [16].
Remark 1: The point (R, d) in R with d = 1 is of considerable interest. These situations correspond to the
perfect secrecy situation, defined as
Rs = max
U→(X,V1,V2)→(Y,Z)
RU1 (12)
The following theorem bounds the secrecy capacity of the proposed wiretap channel with the side information.
Theorem 2: For the discrete memoryless wiretap channel with side information, shown in Fig. 4, we have
Rs ≤ Cs ≤ min{CM , max
U→(X,V1,V2)→(Y,Z)
[I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)]} (13)
where CM is the capacity of the main channel.
Proof: From Theorem 1, we have Rs ≤ Cs ≤ CM and from the result by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [3] we have
Cs ≤ maxU→(X,V1,V2)→(Y,Z)[I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)]. This completes the proof.
IV. THE PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this Section, we prove the achievability of the region R. We prove that the rate equivocation pairs (RU1, 1)
and (RU2, dU2) are achievable and then by implying time–sharing, achievability of the region R′U is proved.
A. (RU1, 1) is Achievable
First we construct random codebooks by the following generation steps:
1) Codebook Generation: .
a. Generate 2N [I(U ;Y )−ǫUY ] i.i.d sequences uN , according to the distribution p(uN) =
∏N
i=1 p(ui).
b. Partition these uN sequences into 2NR bins where R = [RU1 − ǫUY − ǫUV1V2Z ]. Index each bin by j ∈
{1, 2, . . . , 2NR}. Thus each bin contains 2N [max{I(U ;V1,V2),I(U ;Z)}+ǫUV1V2Z ] sequences.
c. Distribute 2N [max{I(U ;V1,V2),I(U ;Z)}+ǫUV1V2Z ] sequences randomly into 2N [max{I(U ;V1,V2),I(U ;Z)}−I(U ;Z)+ǫUV1V2Z+ǫUZ ]
subbin such that every subbin contains 2N [I(U ;Z)−ǫUZ ] sequences. Then index each subbin which contains UN by
w ∈ {1, 2, . . . 2N [max{I(U ;V1,V2),I(U ;Z)}−I(U ;Z)+ǫUV1V2Z+ǫUZ ]}.
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2) Encoding: To transmit message j thorough the main channel with interference vN1 , the transmitter finds j-th
bin of the sequence uN (j) such that (uN , vN1 ) ∈ TNǫ (PUV1 ). We use TNǫ (PUV1 ) to denote the strong typical set
based on the distribution PUV1 , otherwise choose j = 1. The transmitter sends the associated jointly typical xN (j)
generated according to p(xN (j)|uN (j), vN1 ) =
∏N
i=1 p(xi|ui, v1,i)
3) Decoding: The intended receiver receives yn according to the distribution ∏Ni=1 p(yi|xi, v1,i). Then it looks
for the unique sequence uN such that (uN , vN1 ) ∈ TNǫ (PUV1 ) and the index of the bin containing uN is declared
as the transmitted message.
4) Wiretapper: The wiretapper receives a sequence zN according to ∏Ni=1 p(zi|xi, v2,i).
Now, we prove that (RU1, 1) is achievable. As the first step we should prove that Pe −→ 0, as N → ∞. Our
encoding-decoding strategy is similar to the one used in [8] and it is easy to show that the information rate RU1
in the main channel is achievable. For more detail see Appendix A in [8]. As the second step, we should prove
that d→ 1, as N →∞. In this step, we consider the uncertainty of the message to the wiretapper. So we have
H(Sk|ZN )
= H(Sk, ZN)−H(ZN )
= H(Sk, ZN ,W )−H(W |Sk, ZN)−H(ZN )
= H(Sk, ZN ,W,UN )−H(UN |Sk, ZN ,W )−H(W |Sk, ZN)−H(ZN )
= H(Sk,W |ZN , UN) +H(UN , ZN)−H(UN |Sk, ZN ,W )−H(W |Sk, ZN )−H(ZN )
≥(a) H(UN |ZN )−H(UN |Sk, ZN ,W )−H(W |Sk, ZN)
≥(b) H(UN |ZN)−H(UN |Sk, ZN ,W )− log |W| −H(UN |Y N )
=(c) N [I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)]−H(UN |Sk, ZN ,W )
−N [max{I(U ;V1, V2), I(U ;Z)} − I(U ;Z) + ǫUV1V2Z + ǫUZ ]
= NRU1 −H(UN |Sk, ZN ,W )−N [ǫUV1V2Z + ǫUZ ]
(14)
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where
(a) follows from the fact that H(Sk,W |ZN , UN) ≥ 0;
(b) is because of the fact that H(W |Sk, ZN ) ≤ H(W ) ≤ log |W| and H(UN |Y N ) ≥ 0;
(c) follows from the fact that I(UN ;Y N ) = NI(U ;Y ), I(UN ;ZN) = NI(U ;Z) and
log|W| = N [max{I(U ;V1, V2), I(U ;Z)} − I(U ;Z) + ǫUV1V2Z + ǫUZ ].
To compute the second term in (14), we should bound the entropy of the codeword conditioned on the bin j,
subbin w and the wiretapper’s received signal zN . We consider the subbin w in bin j as a codebook, UN in
the codebook as the input message and ZN as the result of passing UN through the wiretap channel. From ZN ,
the decoder estimates the sent message UN . Let g(·) be the decoder and the estimate be UˆN = g(·). Define the
probability of error
PSB = Pr{UˆN 6= UN}. (15)
By Fano’s inequality [17], we have
H(UN |Sk = j,W = w,ZN ) ≤ h(PSB) + PSBN [I(U ;Z)− ǫUZ ]. (16)
Hence
H(UN |Sk,W,ZN) ≤ h(PSB) + PSBN [I(U ;Z)− ǫUZ ]. (17)
Now, we should prove that for arbitrary 0 < λ < 1/2, PSB ≤ λ. The proof is similar to the one in [8]. Thus, we
have bounded PSB for given arbitrary small ǫ and λ.
Combining (5), (14), (17) and the bound on PSB we have
d ≥ 1− ǫUZ − ǫUY − h(λ)/N + λ[I(U ;Z)− ǫUZ ]
RU1 − ǫUY − ǫUV1V2Z
. (18)
Thus we derive that d→ 1, as N →∞.
10
B. (RU2, dU2) is Achievable
From the (7)- (9), it is derived that if I(U ;V1, V2) ≥ I(U ;Z), then the equivocation rate pair (RU2, dU2) is equal
with (RU1, 1). So, we should prove that if I(U ;V1, V2) < I(U ;Z), then (RU2, dU2) is achievable. In this case,
when I(U ;V1, V2) < I(U ;Z), we have
RU2 = I(U ;Y )− I(U ;V1, V2) (19)
dU2 =
I(U ;Y )−I(U ;Z)
I(U ;Y )−I(U ;V1,V2) (20)
Now we introduce the encoding and decoding strategy.
1) Codebook Generation: .
a. Generate 2N [I(U ;Y )−ǫUY ] i.i.d sequences uN , according to the distribution p(uN) =
∏N
i=1 p(u
N ).
b. Partition these sequences into 2NR bins whereR = [RU2−ǫUY−ǫUV1V2 ]. Index each bin by j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2NR}.
Thus each bin contains 2N [I(U ;V1,V2)+ǫUV1V2Z ] sequences.
c. Distribute 2N [max{I(U ;V1,V2),I(U ;Z)}+ǫUV1V2Z ] sequences randomly into 2N [max{I(U ;V1,V2),I(U ;Z)}−I(U ;Z)+ǫUV1V2Z+ǫUZ ]
subbins such that every subbin contains 2N [I(U ;Z)−ǫUZ ] sequences. Then index each subbin containing UN by w ∈
{1, 2, . . .2N [max{I(U ;V1,V2),I(U ;Z)}−I(U ;Z)+ǫUV1V2Z+ǫUZ ]}.
2) Encoding: To transmit message j thorough the main channel with interference vN1 , transmitter finds bin j for
a sequence uN (j) such that (uN , vN1 ) ∈ TNǫ (PUV1 ), otherwise choose j = 1.
3) Decoding: The intended receiver receives yn according to the distribution∏Ni=1 p(yi|xi, v1,i). Then the receiver
looks for the unique sequence uN such that (xN , vN1 ) ∈ TNǫ (PUV1) and the index bin of the bin containing uN
declares as the message index.
4) Wiretapper: The wiretapper receives a sequence zN according to ∏Ni=1 p(zi|xi, v2,i).
To prove that (RU2, dU2) is achievable, first we should prove that Pe → 0, as N → ∞. The proof is similar to
the one in Section IV-A. Then we should prove that dU2 → I(U ;Y )−I(U ;Z)I(U ;Y )−I(U ;V1,V2) , as N → ∞. For this purpose we
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Fig. 5. The new more general Gaussian wiretap channel with side information. The receiver and the wiretapper listen to the sent message
from the separated channels with channel states. These channel states may have some correlation to each other.
can follow the strategy in Section IV-A. So we have
H(Sk|ZN )
≥ N [I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)]−H(UN |Sk, ZN) (21)
and for the second term in (21) like (15) – (17) we have
H(UN |Sk,W,ZN) ≤ h(PSB) + PSBN [I(U ;Z)− ǫUZ ]. (22)
So, combining the above results, we have
d ≥ RU2
RU2 − ǫUY − ǫUV1V2
dU2 − h(λ)/N + λ[I(U ;V1, V2)] + ǫUV1V2
RU2 − ǫUY − ǫUV1V2
. (23)
Thus we have dU2 → I(U ;Y )−I(U ;Z)I(U ;Y )−I(U ;V1,V2) , as N →∞.
V. A NEW GAUSSIAN WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this Section we extend Theorem 1 to the Gaussian case like the approach taken in [8], using the same auxiliary
random variable U . For the new Gaussian wiretap channel shown in Fig. 5, we have the following results based
on Theorem 1.
Theorem 3: (Theorem 1 in Gaussian case For the Gaussian wiretap channel shown in Fig. 5) Using the auxiliary
random variable U = X +αV1, where α is a real number and ρXV1 is the correlation coefficient of X and V1, we
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denote RU as the set of points (R, d) with RU1 ≤ R ≤ RU2, 0 ≤ d ≤ 1, Rd = RU1, where RU1 and RU2 are
defined in (7) and (8). By defining
R′U , {(R
′
, d
′
) : 0 ≤ R′ ≤ R, 0 ≤ d′ ≤ d, (R, d) ∈ RU}, (24)
the set R, defined as follows, is achievable:
R =
⋃
U=X+αV1,α∈R
R′U . (25)
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. We only need to show that RU is achievable for the
specified α and U . Assuming transmitter has the power constraint P , the side information in the main channel
satisfies V1 ∼ N (0, Q1), the wiretap channel has the side information, satisfying V2 ∼ N (0, Q2), ρXV1 , ρXV2
and ρV1V2 represent the correlation coefficient between X , V1 and V2 and P
′
= P [1 + 4ǫ ln 2 +
ρ2XV1
1−ρ2
XV1
]−1 (see
Appendix A), we use some modification in the proof of RU1 as follows.
In the codebook generation, sequence uN are generated according to f(uN) =
∏N
i=1 f(ui), where f(ui) ∼
N (0, P ′ +α2Q1) for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. In the encoding process, xN (j) = uN(j)−αvN1 . The intended receiver
observes yN = xN + vN1 + ηN1 and the wiretapper observes zN = xN + vN2 + ηN2 . As a source constraint, we
should introduce potential error EX(j), which represents in the encoding process and xN (j) = uN (j)−αvN1 does
not satisfy the power constraint.
Then, provided that there is at least one sequence uN(j) jointly typical with vN1 , the probability of error EX(j)
tends to zero. Therefore, the modifications do not influence the achievability proof of RU . Assuming ǫ is arbitrarily
small, since P ′ → P .
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Now, we calculate I(U ;Y ), I(U ;V1, V2) and I(U,Z), with respect to U = X + αV1. We have
I(U ;Y )
= 12 log[
(P+α2Q1+2αρXV1
√
PQ1)(P+Q1+N1+2ρXV1
√
PQ1)
(P+α2Q1+2αρXV1
√
PQ1)(P+Q1+N1+2ρXV1
√
PQ1)−(P+αQ1+(α+1)ρXV1
√
PQ1)2
] (26)
I(U ;V1, V2) =
1
2 log[
(1−ρ2V1V2 )(P+α
2Q1+2αρXV1
√
PQ1)
P (1−ρ2
XV1
−ρ2
XV2
−ρ2
V1V2
+2ρXV1ρXV2ρV1V2 )
] (27)
I(U ;Z)
= 12 log[
(P+α2Q1+2αρXV1
√
PQ1)(P+Q2+N2+2ρXV2
√
PQ2)
(P+α2Q1+2αρXV1
√
PQ1)(P+Q2+N2+2ρXV2
√
PQ2)−(P+ρXV2
√
PQ2+αρXV1
√
PQ1+αρV1V2
√
Q1Q2)2
]
(28)
Then, we introduce Leakage Function ∆I(α) which is defined as ∆I(α) = I(U ;Z)−I(U ;V1V2). Thus, we have
∆I(α) = I(U ;Z)− I(U ;V1V2)
= 12 log[
P (P+Q2+N2+2ρXV2
√
PQ2)(1−ρ2XV1−ρ
2
XV2
−ρ2V1V2+2ρXV1ρXV2ρV1V2)
(P+α2Q1+2αρXV1
√
PQ1)(P+Q2+N2+2ρXV2
√
PQ2)−(P+ρXV2
√
PQ2+αρXV1
√
PQ1+αρV1V2
√
Q1Q2)2
] (29)
Hence
∆I(0) =
1
2
log[
(P +Q2 +N2 + 2ρXV2
√
PQ2)(1 − ρ2XV1 − ρ2XV2 − ρ2V1V2 + 2ρXV1ρXV2ρV1V2)
Q2(1− ρ2XV2) +N2 + 2ρXV2
√
PQ2
] > 0 (30)
and we can find two points α0 and α−0 in which
∆I(α0) = ∆I(α−0) = 0. (31)
Furthermore, there is a point α∗ in which ∆I(α) is maximized, i.e.,
α∗ = − (ρXV1
√
PQ1 + ρV1V2
√
Q1Q2)(P + ρXV2
√
PQ1)− ρXV1
√
PQ1(P +N2 +Q2 + 2ρXV2
√
PQ2)
(ρXV1
√
PQ1 + ρV1V2
√
Q1Q2)2 − 2Q1(P +N2 +Q2 + 2ρXV2
√
PQ2)
(32)
where
max∆I(α) = ∆I(α∗) (33)
Now, we want to study the leakage function. So, denote R(α) = I(U ;Y )−I(U ;V1, V2) and RZ(α) = I(U ;Y )−
I(U ;Z). Because of the complexity of the results, we consider two special cases.
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A. Case I
As the first condition, we assume that Q1 = Q2 = Q, ρXV1 = ρXV2 = 0 and ρV1V2 = 1. In this case our model
reduces to the channel introduced [8] and we have
R(α) =
1
2
log[
P (P +Q+N1)
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1)− (P + αQ)2 ] (34)
which is maximized by α∗ = P
P+N as described in [7] and achieves CM = 12 log[P+NN ], in which CM is the
maximum rate of the main channel. It can be found easily that R(α) is an increasing function with respect to α
as α < α∗, a decreasing function with respect to α as α > α∗.
Similarly, the rate RZ has two extremum points in α = 1 and α = −PQ and it can be shown that RZ is a decreasing
function with respect to α as α < −P
Q
or 1 < α and an increasing function with respect to α as −P
Q
< α < 1.
Then we state the following result.
Theorem 4: For the new Gaussian wiretap channel with side information illustrated in Fig. 5, under the special
conditions explained in Case I, rate equivocation pair (R, d) is achievable if
R ≤ CM
d ≤ 1
Rd ≤


CM 0 < P ≤ P1

R(α0) R ≤ R(α0)
RZ(α) R(α0) ≤ R ≤ CM
P1 ≤ P ≤ P2


RZ(1) R ≤ R(1)
RZ(α) R(1) ≤ R ≤ CM
P2 ≤ P
(35)
where
P1 = −N1 − Q
2
+
√
Q2 + 4QN2
2
(36)
P2 = −Q
2
+
√
Q2 + 4Q(N1 +N2)
2
(37)
We should note that this rate equivocation pair is similar the one presented in [8] and the proof can be found
there. It is clear that under the assumed conditions, our channel reduces to the previous model [8] and we obtain
similar result.
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Corollary 1: [8, Theorem 4-5] For the proposed Gaussian wiretap channel with side information in Case I, the
side information helps to achieve larger rate equivocation region. The proof is similar to the one in [8].
B. Case II
As the second special case, we assume that Q1 = Q2 = Q, ρXV1 = ρXV2 = ρV1V2 = 0 and N1 6= N2. In this
case we have
R(α) =
1
2
log[
P (P +Q+N1)
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1)− (P + αQ)2 ] (38)
which is maximized by α∗ = P
P+N and achieves CM . It can be found that the rate RZ has two extremum points
in α = 1 and α = −P
Q
. As we can see, this points are similar to the one for the functions in the previous case. So,
we state the following result for this case.
Theorem 5: For the proposed Gaussian wiretap channel with side information in Fig. 5, under the special conditions,
a rate pair (R, d) is achievable if
R ≤ CM
d ≤ 1
Rd ≤


CM 0 < P ≤ P3

R(α0) R ≤ R(α0)
RZ(α) R(α0) ≤ R ≤ CM
P3 ≤ P ≤ P4


RZ(1) R ≤ R(1)
RZ(α) R(1) ≤ R ≤ CM
P4 ≤ P
(39)
where
P3 =
(Q− 2N1) +
√
5Q2 + 4Q(N2 −N1)
2
(40)
P4 =
Q
2
+
√
5Q2 + 4QN2
2
(41)
So the obtained results are similar to the previous case for Gaussian wiretap channel with side information.
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CONCLUSION
In this paper, a new applicable wiretap channel with side information was introduced. In this channel, the previous
models were generalized. An achievable equivocation rate region for this channel was derived and then, our result
were extended to the Gaussian case.
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APPENDIX A
THE CONDITION ON AVERAGE POWER CONSTRAINT
In this Section we apply the following lemma to the condition on the average power constraint by letting P ′ =
P [1 + 4ǫ ln 2 +
ρ2XV1
1−ρ2
XV1
]−1.
Lemma 1: Assume that XN and V N1 are two sequences of i.i.d random variables X ∼ N (0, σX) and V1 ∼
N (0, σV1), respectively, with correlation coefficient ρXV1 . Let UN = XN + αV N1 , where α is a constant real
number. If (uN , vN ) ∈ TNU,V1(ǫ), for any ǫ > 0, and σX ≤ P [1 + 4ǫ ln 2 +
ρ2XV1
1−ρ2
XV1
]−1, then [
∑N
i=1 x
2
i ]/N ≤ P .
Proof: Since XN and V N1 are two sequences of i.i.d Gaussian random variables then UN ∼ N (0, σX +
α2σV1 + 2ασXσV1). Furthermore (uN , vN ) ∈ TNU,V1(ǫ) implies that
ǫ > | − 1
N
log p(uN , vN )−H(U, V ) |
=| − 1
N
log p(uN , vN )−H(V )−H(U |V )|
= | − 1
N
log p(uN , vN )−H(V )−H(X |V )|
2ǫ > | − 1
N
log p(uN , vN ) + 1
N
log p(vN )−H(X |V )|
= | − 1
N
log p(uN |vN )−H(X |V )|
= | − 1
N
log p(xN |vN )−H(X |V )|
= | − 1
N
∑N
i=1 log p(xi|v1,i)−H(X |V )|
=(d) 1ln 2 | 12N(1−ρ2
XV1
)
∑N
i=1
x2i
σ2
X
− 2ρXV1 xiv1,iσXσV1 + ρ
2
XV1
v2
1i
σ
V 2
1
+ 12 ln[2πσ
2
X(1− ρ2XV1)]−H(X |V )|
=(e) 1ln 2 |
∑
N
i=1
x2i
2N(1−ρ2
XV1
)σ2
X
− ρ
2
XV1
2(1−ρ2
XV1
)
+ 12 ln[2πσ
2
X(1− ρ2XV1)]− 12 ln[2πeσ2X(1 − ρ2XV1)]|
= 1ln 2 |
∑N
i=1
x2i
2N(1−ρ2
XV1
)σ2
X
− ρ
2
XV1
2(1−ρ2
XV1
)
− 12 |
(42)
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where (d) is because of the jointly distribution function of (xi, v1,i) and (e) is because that
H(X |V ) = H(X)− I(X ;V1) = 1
2
ln(2πeσ2X)−
1
2
ln(
σ2Xσ
2
V1
σ2Xσ
2
V1
− σ2XV1
)
= 12 ln[2πeσ
2
X(1− σ2XV1 )]
(43)
Thus
1
N
N∑
i=1
x2i < σ
2
X [4ǫ ln 2 +
ρ2XV1
1− ρ2XV1
+ 1] (44)
and with the condition on the average power constraint σX ≤ P [1+4ǫ ln 2+ ρ
2
XV1
1−ρ2
XV1
]−1, we have [
∑N
i=1 x
2
i ]/N ≤ P .
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